| | | 12 August 1951 | |
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Army and State Department review(s) completed.

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| 12. | | | | | |
| | GE | ENERAL | el e . w e | | |
| General Eisen to speed integr | GE hower would se ration (page 3). | rve as "Euro | opean Defe | ense Min | ister'' |
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5. Ceylon's government fears internal repercussions over rupper shipments to China (page 6).

NEAR EAST

6. Arab states continue intrigue against integrity of Jordan (page 6).

WESTERN EUROPE

9. French pose condition to acceptance of Greece and Turkey in NATO (page 8).

10. Need for Berlin airlift appears to have been exaggerated (page 9).

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| 25X1A | GENERAL |
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| | 1 Concret Figure bowen would game as UF Defense Minister ! |
| | 1. General Eisenhower would serve as "European Defense Minister" |
| | to speed integration: |
| | US Minister Julius Holmes in London reports a conversation with General Eisenhower as follows: |
| 2. V | NITE and that we there about he lest in |
| 25X1A | "He said that no time should be lost in concluding arrangements which would allow a start on German |
| | forces. He felt that the European army presented the only feasible |
| | means of bringing them into Western defense. He believes that |
| · · · · | the greatest element of delay will be the agreements and arrange- |
| | ments necessary for a European Defense Minister to function. He |
| | is prepared, if he can get satisfactory commitments from the five |
| | governments involved, principally France and Germany, to under- take on a temporary basis the functions of European Defense Minister |
| 1 | in order to get the practical businesss of the recruiting, training |
| | and formation of the force started. |
| 81 | "He made it clear that he would do |
| | this on a personal basis and not as Supreme Allied Commander |
| 318 1 | Europe and that it would naturally have to be for a limited period." |
| 1 | |
| + -4 | <u>Comment</u> : The concept of a "European |
| | Defense Minister, " member of no government, arose during the |
| 5 774.4 | Paris talks on creation of a European army. |
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| 25X1A | 5, | Ceylon's gov | vernment fea | rs internal rep | ercussions o | ver rubber |
| | | | and the second | US Embass National Pa present gov | y officials the rty, which coernment, ca | nnot risk |
| X1 | | to China. He Communist e unfortunate, cation is that request that | e has stated efforts to development but nothing t Ceylon will an exception at this failure. | repeatedly that repeatedly that velop trade in r now can be done not certify und be made in its re might prejud | increasingly ubber with C e about it. T ler the Kem case, despir | y successful eylon are The impli- amendment no te the fore- |
| | | if it reverse exports to al that by conve stand, the Co | d its widely I destination eying the impeylonese are | Comment: y would lose corpublicized policised | ntrol of the g ey of permitt so a possibil ey cannot rev in a US contr | ing rubber ity, however, verse this |
| N.P. | | | | 1 | | |
| 25X1A | | | | NEAR EAS | ST | |
| | 6. | Arab states | continue intr | igue against int | egrity of Jor | dan: |
| | | | | | inister is fla | |

Jordan and Iraq which was renewed by the Iraqi Prime Minister and the

Regent at the time of Abdullah's funeral. It is widely rumored that the Egyptian Legation is agitating for the independence of the western part of Jordan (formerly Arab Palestine) under a mandate of the Arab League. The Saudi Arabian Legation is believed to favor partitioning the country in cooperation with Syria.

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The US Minister feels that although there is no evidence of Jordanian acceptance of these maneuvers, they cannot but disturb the internal political situation and the precarious equilibrium that has existed in the Near East since 1948.

| | Comment: | 25X |
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| 25X1 | The desires of Iraq in this matter are well known. Egypt, which continues to be interested in the Arab Palestine Government of the former Mufti would presumably wish to create an independent Arab Palestine. | |
| 25X1 | The possible role of Ibn Saud is less clear. Recently, he stated in a note to the US Government that "any attempt to change the present situation in the Middle East will not be agreeable to him" and that it is "unjust" to deprive Abdullah's sons of their rights. | 25X1 |
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| | | | WESTERN EURO | PE | | |
| 1 25X1A 9. | | * | | | | |
| 25X1A 8. | French pose c | ondition to | acceptance of Gre | eece and Turke | y in NATO: | |
| 25X1A 9. | French pose o | ondition to | | | | *_ |
| 25X1A 9. | French pose c | ondition to | France will op | pose full NATO | O membersh | ip |
| 25X1A #• | French pose c | ondition to | France will op | pose full NATO I Turkey unles | O membersh s they are | ip |
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pushed the alternate idea of a regional Mediterranean pact embracing Greece and Turkey. The French have been reluctant to include Greece and Turkey in NATO, partly because they felt that growing Western European integration would be hindered, but even more because they have been increasingly jealous of American and British influence in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The three-power Standing Group is the executive arm of the NATO military committee, and as such has direct control of all NATO forces. The French fear that any change which detracted from the authority of the Standing Group might prejudice their efforts to obtain a greater voice in Eastern Mediterranean matters.

| 25X1A ¹⁰ . | Need for | Berlin | airlift | appears | to | have | been | exagg | erated | • |
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In a sharply worded letter to Mayor
Reuter, the Allied Commandants
protest that, although they acceded to
West Berlin's appeal for aircraft to
move goods held up by new Soviet export restrictions, it now appears
that the volume of the backlogged shipments has been overestimated
and the need for an airlift exaggerated.

The airlift has been arranged on the basis of information that 10,000 to 12,000 tons of goods were backlogged. However, in a 3 August meeting between Allied and West Berlin authorities to consider expanding the airlift capacity, it developed that the West Berlin Senate was having difficulty finding sufficient backlogged cargo to fill the limited number of aircraft being used, and that in fact only 300 tons were available for loading within the next three days.

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